Cicero and America by 
[Expositions 8.1 (2014) 145–167]  Expositions (online) ISSN: 1747–5376 
Cicero and America 
 




At the time of the American Founding, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), the Roman orator, 
statesman, and political philosopher, exerted a profound and important influence.1 Cicero’s 
writings constituted a key part of the classical educational curriculum found in almost every 
grammar school, college, and university of the era, the aim of which “was the moulding [sic] of 
liberally educated youths through access to the contents of the Classics.”2 Higher education 
especially “became gradually a training ground for the application of Aristotle, Cicero, Polybius, 
and other political scientists of old to the debates over the Declaration and Constitution.”3 
Leading Americans, including many key figures of the American Revolution, regularly consulted 
the classics, including Cicero, for lessons applicable in their own day. 
It is true that a few Founders came to doubt the utility of the classics for a modern, self-
governing republic—most vocally Benjamin Rush, who emerged after the signing of the 
Constitution as “the principal opponent of classical learning as useless knowledge for America.”4 
Yet, it is precisely this opposition that distinguishes Rush as the exception rather than the rule. 
Indeed, contrary to Rush, “education in the first century of America, predominantly theological 
and classical, was mainly prized for its usefulness” in shaping the character of those who 
benefited from it.5 As the historian Carl Richard has noted, “the founders always endorsed 
classical education on utilitarian grounds, [and] they defined ‘utility’ in the broadest possible 
manner. In addition to the writing models, knowledge, and ideas which the classics furnished, the 
founders contended that they were an indispensable training in virtue.”6 In the end, the failed 
efforts of Rush and others to “dethrone the age-old sovereignty of Latin and Greek” emphasized 
just how entrenched the classical curriculum was, which by 1800 in “the traditional grammar 
schools and the colleges remained virtually unchanged.”7 
In a recent essay, historian Daniel Walker Howe memorialized the ubiquity of the classics in 
early American life and education (while also lamenting the virtual absence of the classics in 
contemporary America, a “state of affairs [that] would come as a shock to the Founders”). Howe 
observed that the Founders “believed that if a modern citizenry were to benefit from the lessons 
of history, its members had to know the history of Greece and Rome.”8 As Meyer Reinhold 
noted, Rome in particular served as a model for the founders of the new nation: “it was 
preeminently the Roman republic that was their exemplar, serving as a timeless model in which 
the civic virtues as well as corrupting vices stood out with classical clarity.”9 It was Cicero, of 
course, who had long been celebrated as the greatest individual embodiment of those ancient 
Roman civic virtues. What is more, given the deep sense of admiration that is on display in the 
writings of so many Renaissance and Enlightenment political thinkers—for whom Cicero “of all 
ancients was possibly the most esteemed and influential,”10 and to whom the American Founders 
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also looked quite frequently for inspiration and guidance—it is no exaggeration to claim that 
Cicero was one of the most influential figures in the American Revolution of any age, ancient or 
modern.11 
However, as Howe noted, except for a few rare and notable exceptions, the classics in general 
and Cicero in particular are hardly studied today, if they are even thought of at all. How is it that 
a political thinker formerly held in such high regard could in our time have fallen so low? By 
contrast, what was it about Cicero’s political thought that the Founders so much admired? Even 
if we today are unable—whether for lack of will, or proper education, or both—to fathom the 
esteem in which Cicero was held in those days, it seems it would behoove us to make the 
attempt, if for no other reason than that a better understanding of what it is we are rejecting 
should provide us with a firmer grasp of what we have embraced in its stead. In so doing, we 
may yet rediscover truths applicable in our own age. 
To that end, this article will offer an overview of Cicero’s decisive impact on Western 
political history, up to and including the America Founding, followed by a consideration of 
Cicero’s De Officiis (On Duties), one of three books—along with De Re Publica (On the 
Republic) and De Legibus (On the Laws)—in which Cicero explicitly treats his characteristic 
teaching or theme of the natural law.12 Since De Legibus and parts of De Re Publica were also 
known to the Founders, this article will also include brief concluding comments on these two 
books. There are at least two reasons for a focus on De Officiis in particular: First, the theoretical 
concept or idea of natural law considered in that book plays a decisive role in the American 
Revolution, most notably in the Declaration of Independence and by extension the Constitution. 
As Richard Gummere observes, the pre-Revolutionary American colonists regarded as 
“fundamental” the ancient idea that “the Law of Nature [...] took precedence over any man-made 
legislation.” This idea “was the higher law, and it became the focus of all colonial appeals, 
culminating in the Declaration of Independence.”13 De Officiis is an important source for our 
understanding of one of the key ideas at the heart of the American political tradition. The second 
and more practical reason is that, of Cicero’s political-philosophical writings, De Officiis, along 
with the Tusculan Disputations, “were the most widely read by early Americans, either as a 
college text or in translation.”14 An examination of one of the texts that early Americans 
themselves turned to most often to learn about the natural law, written by one of the most 
celebrated and revered classical authors of the day, should give us a clearer picture of what they 
thought they were doing in making a revolution in the name of that ancient doctrine. 
And this fact gives rise to a third reason: Cicero writes in his own name in De Officiis, which 
he presents as a letter to his son. This dramatic convention—a father who had achieved supreme 
political glory and been hailed as a savior of the Roman republic, offering philosophical advice 
to a son about how to live a morally virtuous life—underscores the intended educative or 
character-shaping aspect of the work. In other words, not only does the book treat the idea of 
natural law in its theoretical dimension, it is meant to show the fundamental connection of that 
idea to moral virtue, and thereby to illustrate Cicero’s belief in the unbreakable link between 
political theory and political practice. For Cicero, as well as for the American Founders, it is 
147  Caspar 
impossible to understand fully or completely the one apart from the other. De Officiis has the 
effect, and purposely so, of shaping the souls or characters of those who read and take seriously 
its teaching. Which is in fact what happened in America at the time of the Revolution: the 
Founders were steeped, or rather steeped themselves, in a Ciceronian natural law tradition that 
simultaneously prepared them for republican self-government while also indicating to them the 
vital importance of educating future generations in what could properly be called the theory and 
the practice of the natural law. In this sense, Cicero’s work offers us a view, admittedly through a 
Roman window, into the soul—that is, the motivating principles or ideas as well as the habits or 
moral virtues—of those who founded the American regime. 
It is difficult for us today to appreciate the high regard in which previous ages held Cicero. 
Only a handful of contemporary scholars would be likely to echo the sentiments of the English 
classicist J. L. Strachan-Davidson, writing in 1894, just as Cicero’s reputation was entering a 
steep decline: “If we were required to decide what ancient writings have most directly influenced 
the modern world, the award must probably go in favour [sic] of Plutarch’s Lives and of the 
philosophical works of Cicero.”15 Nevertheless, Cicero’s voluminous writings—which include 
letters, speeches, and works of philosophy, politics, and rhetoric—and his ultimately doomed 
efforts to save the Roman Republic have captured the minds of numerous intellectual and 
political figures since his death at the hands of the Second Triumvirate in 43 BC. Regarded as a 
serious philosopher, he was also seen as a model of the virtuous statesman and orator that he 
celebrated in his own writings.16  
Admiration for Cicero has not, of course, been universal, though perhaps no dissenter of any 
age has been as severe as his contemporary political enemy Mark Antony: Plutarch reports that 
Antony, after having insisted on Cicero’s assassination, ordered the head and hands of his 
tormentor fastened over the rostra in the Roman Forum, presumably as a visible warning to 
others who might be tempted to cross him. And yet by contrast, Augustus Caesar, also complicit 
in Cicero’s murder though apparently only reluctantly, when he came upon his grandson trying 
in vain to hide one of Cicero’s books that he had just been reading, said, “My child, this was a 
learned man, and a lover of his country.”17 
Notable among his early admirers are the Roman rhetorician Quintilian—“a devoted 
follower” who considered Cicero to have been “both the Roman Demosthenes and the Roman 
Plato”—as well as the pagan writer Macrobius, who wrote a commentary on the Dream of Scipio 
that would be influential in the Middle Ages.18 Various fourth and fifth century “Christian 
Ciceros” felt his strong influence or even modeled their work on his, including Minucius Felix, 
Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine.19 Yet theirs was not an 
unqualified embrace: “A famous passage in St. Jerome’s letters (xxii.30) tells how, in a grave 
illness, he seemed to himself to be taken before the heavenly judgment-seat and, on claiming to 
be a Christian, to receive the answer, ‘Mentiris: Ciceronianus es non Christianus. […] In 
consequence he foreswore, if but temporarily and ineffectually, the delights of the pagan 
authors.”20 Indeed, this episode did not dissuade Jerome, who “began his concentrated study of 
Cicero after he had received his fateful warning.”21 Cicero’s writings were less well-known in 
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the Middle Ages—despite the fact that all of “Cicero’s extant philosophical works survive in 
Carolingian manuscripts.”22 Particularly admired in the field of rhetoric, he was as “a rule” 
thought of—at least until the twelfth century—as a “philosophical recluse” and was “disguised 
as a monastic scholar.”23 Later, “Dante cites or alludes to Cicero some fifty times, and almost 
always as a philosopher,” at one point describing him as “Rome’s ‘best Aristotelian.’”24 
With the discovery of many of his writings in the fourteenth century—first and most 
importantly by Petrarch, an early Renaissance luminary who recovered the letters to Atticus and 
several speeches, but also by such intrepid archaeologists of antiquity as Poggio Bracciolini, 
Coluccio Salutati, and Boccaccio—and their subsequent publication and dissemination, Cicero’s 
reputation and influence began to arc toward its zenith.25 It was in the Renaissance that Cicero 
assumed his “new place as a guide to life,” and came to be revered as a great statesman and 
philosopher who could serve as a virtuous model for imitation.26 Indeed, Renaissance Humanists 
“were delighted to take Cicero as their model, for as they came to see him, Cicero had both 
preached and practiced the maxim that a good orator is a man of good character who employs his 
rhetorical resources in the public service.”27  
And it was this new view of Cicero that made such a deep and favorable impression on later 
Enlightenment thinkers—such as Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, James Harrington, John Locke, 
Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and David Hume—whose appreciation 
for Cicero seemed only to grow in intensity in comparison to their Renaissance predecessors: 
“Cicero the thinker in action remained the Enlightenment’s ideal, the man who more than anyone 
else embodied the vita activa.”28 Neal Wood describes the eighteenth century as the “peak of 
Cicero’s authority and prestige” and “a Ciceronian century.” Cicero himself was a “leading 
culture-hero of the age: revered as a great philosopher and superb stylist […] a courageous 
statesman and dedicated patriot, the ardent defender of liberty against tyranny.”29 A.E. Douglas 
notes that over these 400 or so years, roughly from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, 
“every educated man had studied something of Cicero’s philosophical writings at school or 
university,” and as a result his “influence is past calculation or analysis.”30  
Which brings us to the American Founders, who inherited what was by the time of the 
Revolution a longstanding tradition of reverence for not only the classics in general but for 
Cicero in particular as a philosopher, statesman, and orator, a tradition that resonated deeply with 
Americans at all levels. As Meyer Reinhold wrote, “Evidence abounds for an American cult of 
antiquity during the eighteenth century.” Perhaps the most important aspect of this deep 
admiration—not to say worship—of the classics “was the tireless and purposeful reading by 
early Americans of the Classics as a repository of timeless models for guidance in republicanism 
and private and civic virtue.”31 The Americans sought out examples not only of good republican 
ideas but good republican behavior that could be honored as well as imitated. Although there 
were “numerous” such “classical role models” whose good character might serve as models for 
emulation in the young republic—e.g., Cato or Cincinnatus—“pride of place was given above all 
to Cicero.”32 Consider John Adams, to take but one of many possible examples, who wrote, “As 
all the ages of the world have not produced a greater statesman and philosopher united than 
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Cicero, his authority should have great weight.”33 The Americans, like so many of those who 
preceded them, were drawn to Cicero because of his noble and heroic example—the great 
statesman offering principled resistance to tyranny in defense of republican government. But 
perhaps even more important for our purposes, Cicero’s political philosophy provided them with 
an explanation and defense of the natural law—a doctrine or idea that lay at the heart of the 
American Revolution and guided the subsequent attempts to found a republican form of 
government—and of the vital connection of that law to moral virtue and prudent statesmanship. 
A noted scholar of the political thought of the American Founding, Charles R. Kesler, has 
written, “the language and logic of natural law run throughout the major documents and debates 
of the period.”34 Meyer Reinhold concurs: “Indeed the classical doctrine of ius naturale enjoyed 
immense prestige in eighteenth-century America, as counter-claim overriding repugnant 
enactments of the crown and Parliament.”35 As early as 1764, in the first major pamphlet to 
appear following the passage of the much despised Stamp Act, James Otis argued that all men, 
including the King and Parliament, were subject to a natural law that forbade the trampling of the 
natural rights of the colonists. Otis was convinced that his brethren across the ocean would 
eventually see the error of their ways, and so counseled obedience in what he believed would 
prove to be the interim.36 Eventually, of course, as it became clear there would be no admission 
of wrongdoing and the situation only continued to deteriorate, obedience to a higher law would 
trump obedience to the so-called British constitution or British civil law, and the result was the 
Declaration of Independence.37 
It is here that the natural law makes its most obvious, but also most important, appearance: the 
Declaration’s argument relies explicitly on “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” as its 
guiding principle.38 Edward Corwin, in his indispensable little book The “Higher Law” 
Background of American Constitutional Law (1955), shows that the notion of natural law or a 
higher law, while it may have entered the American political tradition most directly or explicitly 
through the writings of John Locke, has deep and important roots in the writings of Cicero. 
Corwin traces a continuity of thought, at least in terms of natural law or a higher law, from the 
ancients to the American Founding.39 Indeed, we can look to Thomas Jefferson himself, the 
principal author of the Declaration, for confirmation of both the continuity and the Ciceronian 
influence: when asked to cite the sources to which he looked when writing the document, 
Jefferson pointed to “the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, 
etc.”40 Though he mentions two ancients and two moderns as his primary sources (never mind 
the rather pregnant “etc.”), what unites these authors in Jefferson’s mind is their common 
concern for public right or the right of the public to have a say in who rules them. In other words, 
Cicero’s political teaching about “public right”—whose characteristic feature, to repeat, is the 
natural law—constitutes one of the American Founding’s essential classical roots. 
What does Cicero have to say about natural law in De Officiis?41 In the introduction to the 
work, Cicero tells his young son Marcus, who at the time was studying in Athens with Cratippus, 
the leading Peripatetic philosopher of the day, that this kind of topic is “preeminently suitable to 
your age and my authority” (De Officiis 1.4). But the work is not meant only for his son, rather it 
Cicero and America  150 
is “also directed at others, particularly young Romans of the governing class.” Cicero believed 
that his “philosophical teaching could have a beneficial effect, particularly on the young.”42 On 
the one hand, Cicero addresses those aspiring gentlemen of any age who, like his son, must be 
taught that the purpose of philosophical study is to prepare oneself to serve the republic. As 
Cicero notes, it is “contrary to duty to be drawn […] away from practical achievements” by a 
“devotion” to “the learning of truth.” Instead, he says, “all the praise that belongs to virtue lies in 
action” (De Officiis 1.18–19). This lesson was certainly not lost on the American Founders, for 
whom the study of the classics was, as we have seen, of great value for its “usefulness” in 
shaping the kind of character necessary to perpetuate freedom and republican government.43 On 
the other hand, given the political crisis facing Rome in Cicero’s own day, it would not be 
surprising if Cicero also means to address those who may have studied Aristotle’s teaching 
regarding the great-souled or magnanimous man with Peripatetic teachers like Cratippus but 
drawn the wrong lesson. When Aristotle writes in his Nicomachean Ethics that the great-souled 
man is “like a rule and measure of what is beautiful and pleasant,” he suggests or implies that 
such a man is above or beyond conventional law or the laws of the regime, and that he deserves 
the greatest kind of honor (NE 1113a29–36). This teaching could have the ill, if unintended, 
effect of encouraging men like Caesar, who hold to a defective or perverted view of 
magnanimity, to sacrifice the common good for the sake of their personal quest for political 
glory. As Cicero notes, “It is a hateful fact that loftiness and greatness of spirit all too easily give 
birth to willfulness and an excessive desire for preeminence. Similarly, the more outstanding an 
individual is in greatness of spirit, the more he desires complete pre-eminence, or rather to be 
sole ruler.” And this “desire to surpass all others” leads one to sacrifice the demands of justice, to 
be willing to tear the political society apart in pursuit of this selfish ambition to rule without 
constraint (De Officiis 1.64). 
Cicero seeks to educate such men that to have a truly “brave and great spirit” one must first 
have “disdain for things external,” and secondly one should seek to aid the republic by doing 
“deeds which are great” and “above all beneficial” while also undertaking on its behalf “difficult 
and laborious tasks” that “endanger both life itself and much that concerns life” (De Officiis 
1.66). In other words, greatness of soul is achieved by putting the common good ahead of one’s 
personal ambitions, and this is true whether one has read Aristotle on magnanimity or not. Cicero 
wants to turn these men away from the immoderate pursuit of personal political glory—which 
can only lead to a competition for rule, the gradual destruction of superintending and moderating 
political institutions, and finally to the kind of tyranny that in fact occurred under Caesar. Rather, 
anyone who seeks pre-eminence will “devote himself entirely to the republic […] and will 
protect the whole in such a way that the interest of none is disregarded.” He will “adhere to 
justice and what is honorable” no matter what the personal cost may be (De Officiis 1.86).  
Cicero is not speaking here to the truly magnanimous or great-souled man as described by 
Aristotle. Indeed, he makes it clear at the beginning of the book that he speaks not to the man 
capable of “perfect” duties, but rather he speaks to those “medium” men who fall short of 
perfection, who seek to do their duty but may occasionally stumble or even be tempted to turn 
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away from true virtue toward a beguiling but ultimately corrupting imitation of it (De Officiis 
1.8; 3.13–15).44 This is why he critiques the kind of defective magnanimity or pride that he sees 
so much in evidence in his own day, and he recommends in response that “men whom success 
has made unbridled and over-confident should be led into the training-ring of reason and 
learning,” there to have their overzealous pride broken and eventually harnessed by justice and 
moderation (De Officiis 1.90). It is all too tempting, when blinded by the immoderate pursuit of 
glory, to deny that reason gives “commands” to human “impulse” (De Officiis 1.101). But a 
proper understanding of human nature will reveal that this nature is in fact subject to a “law of 
nature,” a law that commands “obedience” and submission “to reason” (De Officiis 1.102; cf. De 
Re Publica 3.33, De Legibus 1.18 and 2.8). This lesson, too, would have resonated deeply in 
America at a time when the colonists had become convinced that the King and Parliament were 
seeking a kind of political triumph or glory at the expense of the natural rights of the colonists.  
In response to this situation, the Americans—taking their cue from Cicero, as well as many 
others, as Jefferson later noted—appealed to a natural law that, they believed, governed all 
human beings, even a sovereign King and his complicit Parliament. It was because of his 
repeated and egregious violations of “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” catalogued in 
the Declaration of Independence, that the signers of the Declaration assailed King George III as 
“barbarous” and therefore “totally unworthy” to be “the Head of a civilized nation.” Because the 
King displayed such a tyrannical “character,” he was declared “unfit to be the ruler of a free 
people.” In other words, it is only through obedience to the natural law that an individual or a 
political community may become civilized and come to possess the character appropriate to 
freedom and republican self-government rather than to the kind of tyranny and slavery so 
emblematic of barbarism in general and of this barbarian king in particular. Conversely, if 
individuals or political communities are civilized and possessed of good character (and the 
argument of the Declaration indicates the Americans think of themselves as such), they will seek 
constantly to live up to the natural law and to obey it. Indeed, obedience to this higher law may 
even require a people to disobey the civil or conventional law under which they live. Or, to put it 
in the language of the Declaration, “prudence” may “dictate” that “the Right of the People to 
alter or to abolish” their government has now become a “duty” or obligation to the natural law 
“to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.” To engage 
justly in a revolution of this type, that is, in a revolution that is not simply willful or an act of 
force but rather an act commanded by the right reason that is natural law, requires not only a 
careful study of the natural law—that is, knowledge of principles or doctrine—but also habits of 
behavior that are consistent with and even demanded by those principles or that doctrine, habits 
that when properly and fully developed are nothing other than the moral virtues. 
Given that Cicero’s response to the kind of defective pride he seeks to tame and re-direct is to 
propose, in sum, that it obey the command of reason—in other words he seeks to moderate it—it 
is perhaps not surprising that the first explicit mention of the law of nature (lege naturae) occurs 
in the context of the discussion of the virtue of decorum or seemliness, Cicero’s new or at least 
re-defined and expanded version of moderation, which he equates with the whole of virtue, what 
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he calls honestum or the honorable (De Officiis 1.102). Cicero writes that the “essence” of 
decorum “cannot be separated from what is honorable: for what is seemly is honorable, and what 
is honorable is seemly” (De Officiis 1.93) What this means is that every virtuous act—whatever 
the particular virtue of soul that is on display—necessarily also entails obedience to the natural 
law and a corresponding display of seemliness or decorum, that is, an outward manifestation of 
the moderation that is wrapped up with every virtue of soul.  
The fact that the natural law applies to all human beings causes Cicero to emphasize the 
“medium” nature of his discussion, and of his audience (De Officiis 1.8, 3.13–15). He writes, 
“Therefore this seemliness of which I speak relates to the whole of honorableness; and it is 
related in such a way that is it not seen by esoteric reasoning (ut non recondita quadam ratione 
cernatur), but springs ready to view” (De Officiis 1.95). The individual virtues may be separated 
from decorum in thought, as indeed they so often are by those philosophical speculators whom 
Cicero very much means to chastise: those dogmatic philosophical sects of his own day, of 
which he was so often critical for spending all their time getting lost in “esoteric reasoning” at 
the expense of their duty to the Roman republic. As Walter Nicgorski has written, Cicero thought 
this kind of dogmatism—which necessarily leads to abstruse and apolitical philosophical 
inquiries—to be a serious “failing,” and he sought instead to speak to “all erudite readers.”45 But 
virtues that may be separable in theory turn out to be inseparable in everyday life, in life as lived 
by “medium” men in pursuit of medium virtue. One need not be capable of “perfect” (perfectum) 
duties, in other words, to be able to see and understand a display of healthy virtue, which by its 
very seemliness or decorousness will offer a kind of proof of its own inherent goodness.  
Cicero’s teaching is in this sense anti-aristocratic and as such would likely have constituted 
another element of its appeal to the Founders of the American republic: wise and magnanimous 
human beings—or those kings and aristocrats who pretend to be such—are not the only ones 
who can recognize, and hope to imitate, the virtues necessary for the success of a democratic 
republic. Rather, Cicero very much seeks to exhort good men who give “any indication of 
virtue,” who are not “perfect” and not “clearly wise,” and who possess not true virtue but 
“images of virtue” (simulacra virtutis), to live honorable or virtuous, lives (De Officiis 1.46; 
3.13–15). Indeed, as Publius noted in Federalist 55, a virtuous populace is the sine qua non of 
republican self-government: “Republican government presupposes the existence of these 
qualities [i.e., the moral virtues] in a higher degree than any other form.”46 
Now, it is true—and makes sense in a work devoted to knowing and doing one’s duties within 
the larger context of “public right”—that De Officiis gives primary emphasis or pride of place to 
justice, which Cicero calls “the most illustrious of the virtues” (virtutis est splendor maximus), 
and on account of which “men are called good” (viri boni) (De Officiis 1.20; cf. 1.153–160). 
Indeed, Cicero says later in the work that justice is “the mistress and queen of virtues” (De 
Officiis 3.28). What is more, it is only through adherence to justice that one might achieve true 
and lasting glory: greatness of soul that seeks personal advantage at the expense of the common 
good is “empty of justice,” and is therefore no virtue, but “a vice” and a “savagery which repels 
all humaneness (humanitatem)” (De Officiis 1.62; cf. 1.63–65, 86, 92, 157; 2.31–43; De Re 
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Publica 6.20–29). But De Officiis as a whole is striking in its emphasis on the virtue of 
moderation or what Cicero calls decorum, an aspect of the work that would have been 
particularly appealing to American colonists who thought the recent acts of the King represented 
the height of political immoderation. The Declaration’s indirect suggestion that only God may 
hold all three powers of government, and its indictment of the King for attempting to do the 
same, is an accusation of the worst kind of immoderate pursuit of political glory—not to mention 
injustice—which could only eventuate in the destruction of consent by the governed and would 
necessarily culminate in the worst kind of tyranny.47 A natural law that emphasizes political 
moderation would then have been particularly well-received. 
Not only has Cicero told us that the “essence” of decorum “cannot be separated” from 
honestum, that is, from the entirety of virtue, in the same passage he elaborates on this virtue’s 
comprehensive nature by describing its various component parts: a sense of shame (verecundia), 
the appropriate embellishment or decoration of life (ornatus vitae), temperance (temperantia), 
modesty (modestia), a calming of perturbations or agitations in the soul (sedatio perturbationem 
animi), and due measure (modus) in all things (De Officiis 1.93). In keeping with his aim of 
speaking to “medium” men, Cicero does not speak precisely about moderation, but instead 
emphasizes its broad or all-encompassing character. Along those lines, it should be noted that 
this approach constitutes a rejection of Plato’s equation of the virtue of moderation with 
knowledge—which may be helpful for the philosopher but is not of much use for Cicero’s 
“medium” man—but also goes beyond Aristotle’s circumscribed definition of moderation as 
being concerned only with bodily pleasures.48 Or perhaps it is better to say that these older 
definitions of moderation are incorporated within Cicero’s broader understanding of decorum, a 
virtue which now becomes the primary virtue of the gentleman who is the explicit object of this 
book.49 Decorum becomes the outward and necessary manifestation of any particular virtue of 
soul and whatever honorable act may follow from it. Honorable actions, whether having to do 
with the proper use of reason and speech, justice, or courage, are by definition decorous or 
seemly actions as well (De Officiis 1.94).  
The virtue of decorum is evidence of a life lived in accordance with nature, which “has 
imposed on us” our “role” (personam), which “greatly excels and surpasses that of other 
creatures” (De Officiis 1.97). In fact, nature’s imposition takes two forms: “one is common, 
arising from the fact that we all have a share in reason and in the superiority by which we surpass 
the brute creatures.” Cicero is here emphatic: “Everything honorable and seemly is derived from 
this” (a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur). Employing the very reason that distinguishes 
us from the lower animals enables us to play our proper “role” and discern what is truly 
honorable. But we must also be mindful of differences between and among individual natures or 
“souls” (animis) (De Officiis 1.107). Though we should never act “contrary to universal nature,” 
we must always keep in mind and “follow our own nature, so that even if other pursuits should 
be weightier and better, we should measure our own by the rule (regula) of our own nature” (De 
Officiis 1.110). Universal nature or reason may suggest the best possible choice or action in a 
particular situation, but the “rule of our own nature” may force us to abandon the best in favor of 
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the choice or action of which we are individually capable. Such a choice is no less honorable for 
failing to be perfect, a teaching in line with the overall aim of De Officiis, which is to produce a 
certain type of “gentleman” (liberali) who understands the difference between universal and 
particular natures and seeks to carry out his particular duty to nature as best he can in his own 
life (De Officiis 1.96; cf. 1.8, 46; 3.13–15). 
In other words, the “role” that “nature” imposes on each of us is nothing other than our “duty” 
to do what our universal and individual natures, taken together, command in any given situation. 
This means that, in the case of a human nature that is “two-fold” (duplex), divided into reason 
and appetite, one part of that nature, reason, must “command,” and the other part, appetite, must 
“obey.” To live life in this way, where reason rules and each and every action we take can be 
explained by that reason, is “practically a definition of duty.” Cicero had earlier said that nature 
“imposed” (imposuit) our proper roles upon us; now he makes nature’s imposition or command 
explicit: “the law of nature” demands that the appetites or passions obey reason (De Officiis 
1.100–102; cf. 1.97, 131–132).  
The natural law that governs all human beings in every age and in every nation makes its first 
explicit appearance in the context of Cicero’s discussion of decorum or the seemly, the proper 
manifestation or outward appearance that honestum or the honorable must necessarily take. 
Every human being, and every political community, thus has a duty to nature itself to submit the 
passions to reason, to obey a natural law that commands certain rules of decorum, in all areas of 
life. The natural law demands of all those who seek to display these virtues—not only 
moderation, but also wisdom, justice, and courage—that in their pursuit of honestum they never 
forget that an appropriate decorum is also required. The natural law first comes to sight as a 
teaching about political moderation. 
The fundamentally moderate aspect of the natural law would not have been lost on Americans 
of the Founding generation. Neither would Cicero’s conclusion in the third book of De Officiis 
that the law of nature justifies the killing of a tyrant, an act that at first glance is striking for its 
seeming immoderation (De Officiis 3.19, 32). How does the most reasonable of laws, the law of 
nature, lead to—indeed command—such a violent outcome? In the third and final book of De 
Officiis, Cicero’s subject is the resolution of apparent conflicts between the honorable 
(honestum—the subject of the first book) and the useful or beneficial (utile—the subject of the 
second book), a conflict that could only come about in the case of “medium” men in pursuit of 
their “second-rate” (secunda) duties, but never in the case of the wise man for whom such a 
conflict would not be possible (De Officiis 3.15).50 To resolve such conflicts, Cicero derives a 
corollary from the law of nature discussed above, which he calls in Latin a formula. This 
formula, when applied to seeming conflicts between the useful and the honorable, will allow 
those who employ it to “pronounce judgment without error.” He is emphatic about the reliability 
of this formula: “If we follow this when comparing courses, we shall never fall away from duty 
(ab officio)” (De Officiis 3.19). The application of this formula will show—inexorably if 
properly applied—that whatever is honorable is also useful, and whatever is truly useful will 
necessarily be honorable as well (De Officiis 3.20). 
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Cicero’s definition and ensuing discussion of his formula emphasize the fact that it is 
derivative from the law of nature, which commands the impulses to follow reason. “Now then: 
for one man to take something from another and to increase his own advantage (commodum) at 
the cost of another’s disadvantage (incommodo) is more contrary to nature than death, than 
poverty, than pain, and than anything else that may happen to his body or external possessions” 
(De Officiis 3.21). In other words, to seek one’s own personal advantage at the expense of the 
political community would lead only to the destruction of “the common life and fellowship of 
men” (convictum humanum et societatem), which fellowship is “most of all in accordance with 
nature” (De Officiis 3.21). The reason of nature itself (naturae ratio)—which Cicero equates in 
this context with the “law of nations” (iure gentium) as well as the “divine and human law” (lex 
divina et humana)—therefore commands us never to harm another person for the sake of our 
own advantage, and those of us who seek to “live in accordance with nature” will obey this 
command (De Officiis 3.23). Indeed, “a man who is obedient to nature cannot harm another 
man” (De Officiis 3.25). Any human being who follows the dictates of his reason, or the law of 
nature, understands that to seek personal glory or advantage at the expense of the common good 
is contrary to human nature. It is to act in a way that is less than fully human. It is to act more 
like a beast—or, as in the case of King George III, a barbarian—than a man. 
To put this lesson positively, nature itself commands “all men” to seek “one object,” which is 
that the “benefit (utilitas) of each individual and of all together should be the same” (De Officiis 
3.26). Cicero’s formula measures utility or usefulness by a political standard: in terms of its 
relation to the entire regime. Any act that is truly useful for the entire regime, as opposed to one 
part of that regime, may be considered honorable. When a “medium” man has cause to “doubt” 
whether a particular course of action that would be beneficial could also be considered 
honorable, Cicero’s formula serves to reveal whether there is merely an apparent, or an actual, 
conflict. It is notable that the formula itself is in fact useful for the type of “medium” gentleman 
in actual regimes who must constantly resolve real or apparent conflicts between the honorable 
and the useful. This formula—like medium duties themselves—is “shared, and widely 
accessible” (De Officiis 3.13–15, 18).  
If Cicero’s formula aids us in the discovery of our duty, then “the law of nature” commands 
us to carry that duty out, which could include, depending on the circumstances, the duty to kill a 
tyrant (De Officiis 3.27, 30, 31; cf. 1.102, 3.69, 72, 81). Cicero suggests tyrannicide is one of 
those troubling cases in which there is “doubt” whether an act that is seemingly beneficial is also 
honorable. Though the citizens suffering under the tyrant’s yoke may have no doubts about the 
honorableness of the action, nevertheless, it is not to be undertaken lightly, especially given the 
fact that the tyrant’s murderers will likely be those closest to him, his real or at least his 
pretended friends. But, at the end of the day, tyrannicide is an “example” of an act that is 
“generally and customarily considered to be dishonorable” but upon closer inspection “is found 
not to be so” (De Officiis 3.19). Why? Because the tyrant has violated the most sacrosanct of the 
laws of nature that governs the political community: his political success embodies the most 
extreme violation of the natural law that commands us to seek what is useful or advantageous for 
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the entire political community, and not just for ourselves. The tyrant triumphs at the expense of 
every other member of the regime, leading Cicero to declare that “there can be no fellowship 
between us and tyrants—on the contrary there is complete estrangement” (De Officiis 3.19). The 
community that existed between and among the tyrant and the other members of the society is, in 
effect, dissolved. Indeed, if the citizens of the regime do not act to “amputate” this unhealthy 
“limb,” which flourishes at the expense of the remainder of the body politic, the body itself is in 
danger of dying. It is the tyrant’s immoderation that threatens the well-being of the regime; 
killing the tyrant would restore the moderate balance necessary to continued political life. From 
this point of view, tyrannicide—obeying the natural law rather than the civil law of the tyrant—
aims at a restoration of the kind of political moderation that the natural law demands (De Officiis 
3.32). 
It should be noted that Cicero speaks of the killing of a tyrant as an “example”—perhaps the 
starkest kind of example—“that can be more widely applied” (De Officiis 3.19). Regime change 
in the direction of the natural law does not necessarily imply the literal death of tyrannical rulers, 
only their political demise. But the natural law does justify their killing if they resist attempts to 
depose them and to restore “public right.” The American Founders seem to have taken both 
lessons, or implications, of the natural law to heart. The Declaration of Independence accuses the 
King of England of barbarian acts that mark him out as a tyrant, which justifies the American 
people when they act “to dissolve the political bands which have connected them” with Great 
Britain and “to assume among the powers of the earth” a “separate and equal station.” The 
Americans believe that “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them” to this “station.” 
The natural law is the foundation or source of the “self-evident” truths that “all men are created 
equal” and “that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” The King 
has violated that equality and trampled on those rights, and he is therefore in violation of natural 
law. In other words, the Americans thought their claim was eminently just, and they had a right 
to separate to escape the tyranny under which they found themselves. They thought they had a 
right to effect peaceful regime change, in the somewhat innocuous language of the Declaration, 
“to dissolve” the current political arrangement. However, they also made it clear that if the King 
wanted a fight, they believed the natural law imposed on them a “duty” to defend their rights, 
and to risk their “Lives,” their “Fortunes,” and their “Sacred Honor.” If it came to it, they 
thought themselves justified in killing the King or his soldiers, in defense of their freedom, 
which they ultimately saw as a defense of the natural law itself, and a defense of the most 
moderate kind of political order. 
Cicero’s De Officiis offers a kind of training manual in virtue for the young and ambitious 
members of any regime, who, if they take the book’s lessons to heart—lessons grounded firmly 
in the law of nature—will be educated in a manner consistent with the good of the whole regime, 
or with what Jefferson called “public right.” Cicero’s book on duties helps to clarify and deepen 
our understanding of the natural law doctrine utilized by the Founders in making their revolution, 
while simultaneously establishing the indissoluble link between the natural law and the moral 
virtues. In that sense, De Officiis is not only a theoretical work of political philosophy, it has the 
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honorable and beneficial effect of fostering and encouraging the moral virtues in those who read 
it and take its teaching about natural law seriously. In the best case, latter-day students of Cicero 
will be led to see that taking the law of nature seriously means doing one’s best to live up to that 
law by striving to exhibit all the virtues, and doing so with the kind of moderation or decorum 
that characterizes all true virtue. This individual or personal moderation or decorum may then 
serve as the basis for proper political moderation or decorum in the regime and its institutions. 
Cicero completes this teaching about natural law and political moderation in De Re Publica 
and De Legibus. The fragmentary text of De Re Publica that we have today would not have been 
known to the Founders during the Revolution. As John Adams lamented in a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson, the loss of this work was “as much to be regretted as that of any Production of 
Antiquity.”51 However, they did know some fragments of the work that had been preserved in 
other sources. Historian Carl Richard noted that James Wilson cited his “idol” Cicero “more 
often than any other author in his 1790 lectures to law students at the College of Philadelphia 
(now the University of Pennsylvania),” including an explicit quotation from De Re Publica: 
“True law is right reason, consonant with nature, spread through all people. It is constant and 
eternal; it summons to duty by its orders, it deters from crime by its prohibitions.”52  
In keeping with the teaching of De Officiis, natural law or the “true law” is nothing other than 
reason itself, giving correct commands to the appetites or passions. Notably this law dispenses 
“orders” or commands (iubendo) which merely “summon” or call (vocet) us to do our “duty” 
(officium). Likewise, this higher law only “deters” us from criminal violations of it through its 
“prohibitions,” but does not possess the ability to inflict what are commonly thought of as 
punishments. This means, as Cicero goes on to explain, that only “good” people will obey this 
law’s commands and prohibitions, but the “wicked” are not moved by them. The natural law is 
thus a law for the gentleman of De Officiis who cares about virtue and who seeks to live in a just 
regime. It is only this sort of person who will realize that he has violated the natural law, and will 
then find he is living “in exile from himself.” If the gentleman “scorns his nature” in this way, he 
will be acutely aware that he is paying “the greatest penalty,” or the gentleman’s penalty, which 
is his inner knowledge of wrongdoing. The natural law can only have an effect on the wicked 
insofar as it is incorporated into conventional law and given political teeth.  
Thus, Cicero in De Re Publica begins to sketch a model or “example” (exemplum) of the best 
and most practicable republic, to give an institutional home to the political moderation he 
celebrates in De Officiis, by connecting the virtue of the gentleman to the virtue of the republic 
(De Re Publica 1.70, 2.66). Most importantly, Cicero’s best republic is a mixed republic, a mix 
of the three pure forms of regime—monarchy or the rule of one, aristocracy or the rule of a few, 
and democracy or the rule of the many—which Cicero praises as most stable and most moderate 
precisely because it avoids the faults endemic to each pure form (De Re Publica 1.43–45, 54, 
69). The character Scipio is emphatic: Nothing (nihil) is more moderate (moderatius) than this 
type of arrangement (De Re Publica 1.52). In other words, such a mixed regime hews most 
closely to the standard of decorum or political moderation demanded by natural law. Though a 
mixed regime, it will be led primarily by the “authority” of the best men of the regime whose 
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institutional home will be the senate (De Re Publica 1.57; cf. De Legibus 3.28). The education 
prescribed in De Officiis is meant to produce Cicero’s “model statesman,” to use Walter 
Nicgorski’s phrase—or the rector rei publicae—who will seek to rule prudently in this senate on 
behalf of the people as a whole (De Re Publica 2.51).53 As J. G. F. Powell has written, “The 
Roman senatorial order ideally functions as a reservoir of good and prudent rectores rei 
publicae, or in plain English, of statesmen, any of whom can take the helm when required.”54 
The centrality of the institution of the senate and the natural law statesmen who will populate 
it links the book on duties and the book on the republic with De Legibus, in which Cicero 
legislates the establishment of the institutional home of political moderation or decorum.55 
Cicero writes several times in De Legibus that he is legislating for Scipio’s mixed republic as 
described in De Re Publica (De Legibus 1.20; 2.14, 23; 3.4, 12), legislation he grounds firmly in 
the same natural law that calls us to do our duty in our study and practice of the moral virtues, 
and then in the establishment of the mixed republic that both reflects and fosters those virtues. 
The foundation of Cicero’s legislation is “highest reason, rooted in nature (ratio summa, insita in 
natura),” which commands or orders us to do those things “that ought to be done (quae facienda 
sunt),” while at the same time prohibiting “the opposite things (contraria)” (De Legibus 1.18). 
Reason, he writes later in the book, impels us to do right things and calls us away from wrong 
ones (De Legibus 2.10). Furthermore, in De Legibus he emphasizes the crucial importance of 
honestum (what he had equated with decorum or the honorable in De Officiis), which he 
mentions no less than 13 times in his discussion of the natural foundation of all just laws (De 
Legibus 1.10, 32, 37, 41, 44 [2], 45 [2], 46 [2], 48, 54, 55).  
Only if the senate is in fact a model of virtuous behavior (specimen) and free from vice 
(vitio)—only if it embodies the honestum and so also the decorum that is the aim of the 
education in De Officiis and which is so characteristic of the aristocracy that rules or guides the 
regime of De Re Publica—will Cicero’s natural law republic be possible. It is notable that no 
citizen may enter the senate except by popular approval, a stipulation that preserves the mixed 
character of the regime, but also demands a populace virtuous enough to approve only those 
qualified for the task. Indeed, the bar is set quite high for the entire republic: As the character 
Marcus notes in De Legibus, the present speech (oratio) refers not to men of the present day but 
to those of the future (futuris), “if any of them will wish to obey these laws.” And they will only 
wish to do so if they are the recipients of “a certain education and training,” of the kind described 
especially in De Officiis. Cicero’s three-part teaching about politics suggests that the founding 
and perpetuation of the natural law republic will not be possible unless it is solidly grounded in 
moral virtue or honestum (De Legibus 3.27–29). 
The American Founders surely learned much from their study of De Officiis—as well as De 
Re Publica and De Legibus. Perhaps no lesson was more important for them than the fact that an 
unchanging human nature serves as the source of an eternal or timeless natural law that 
commands us to do our duty both individually and on behalf of the political community. Cicero 
sums up this duty in his concept of honestum or honorableness—right or appropriate action in 
every situation, no matter the virtue, or virtues, on display. The Founders were likely to have 
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seen in Cicero’s view confirmation of their own view that human life takes place within fixed 
moral boundaries or limits that no one may rightly or justly cross. The attempt by the King of 
England to violate those limits, to disobey the law of nature, imposed on the Founders a duty to 
defend that law, and in so doing to defend human nature itself. 
In our own time, it is no accident that Cicero and the American Founders are held in such low 
regard. Beginning in the nineteenth century, German historians—especially Theodor Mommsen 
and his predecessor Wilhelm Drumann, whom one scholar dubbed Cicero’s “most diabolical 
detractor”—working under the influence of the founder of historicism, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel, launched an attack against Cicero from which he has yet to recover.56 For them, the hero 
of ancient Rome was the world-historical figure of Julius Caesar. By contrast, they saw Cicero 
the politician as a cowardly if eloquent defender of aristocratic privilege (i.e., of his own self-
interest) who failed to save the tottering Roman Republic, and they dismissed Cicero the political 
thinker as unoriginal and an eclectic transmitter of mostly Greek ideas. Following the rise of 
historicism, Cicero, and classical learning more generally, virtually disappeared from educational 
curricula in America in the twentieth century.57 Only recently has the study of Cicero begun to 
make a very slow and gradual recovery. Likewise, the political thought and practices of the 
American Founders came under heavy attack in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
by politicians and political scientists who had also been heavily influenced by German 
historicism. Leading figures such as Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, John Dewey, 
Herbert Croly, Frank Goodnow, and many others attacked the Founders’ principles as outdated 
and peculiar to their own age, which in turn served as a basis for rejecting the Founders’ political 
practice, especially their ideas of separation of powers and limited government.58 
The American Founders understood, in no small part because of their reading of Cicero, that 
“the natural law character of the Constitution was essential to its remaining a limited 
Constitution. Natural law was the ground of the limited Constitution.”59 The Founders also 
understood that this same natural law commanded the practice of the moral virtues on the part of 
those citizens who live under a limited Constitution. Limited government and moral virtue are 
two sides of the same natural law coin. If we as a nation are ever to return to a limited 
Constitution of the kind the Founders established, we will have to rediscover the idea of natural 
law—and take seriously once again the moral virtues—upon which such a Constitution is 
necessarily based. The task for proponents of a limited Constitution is thus in one sense quite 
clear: they must engage in a type of political-philosophical archaeology, which if pursued with 
diligence and thoughtfulness will lead them back through many and varied sources, to be sure, 
and if pursued all the way to its very roots must lead them eventually to one of the greatest 
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